[slf4j-dev] Remote code execution vulnerability in log4j 2.x

Wessel van Norel delgurth at gmail.com
Fri Dec 10 12:10:22 CET 2021


According to this translated post, 121 limits one of the attack vectors. 191 is needed to mitigate more attack vectors.

https://www-cnblogs-com.translate.goog/yyhuni/p/15088134.html?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en-US <https://www-cnblogs-com.translate.goog/yyhuni/p/15088134.html?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en-US>

Wessel


> On 10 Dec 2021, at 12:05, Gary Gregory <garydgregory at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> It also can be avoided by not using an old version of Java as Java 8u121 (see https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/javase/8u121-relnotes.html <https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/javase/8u121-relnotes.html>) protects against remote code execution by defaulting "com.sun.jndi.rmi.object.trustURLCodebase" and "com.sun.jndi.cosnaming.object.trustURLCodebase" to "false".
> 
> Gary
> 
> On Fri, Dec 10, 2021, 04:36 Ceki Gülcü <ceki at qos.ch <mailto:ceki at qos.ch>> wrote:
> 
> Hello all,
> 
> You might have heard of a Remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in 
> log4j 2.x, that allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code by 
> controlling the contents of a single logged message. While 
> vulnerabilities are reported now and then, this vulnerability is totally 
> unheard of in its severity.
> 
> As for logback, while logback claims to be the successor to log4j 1.x, 
> logback is unrelated to log4j 2.x. It does not share code nor 
> vulnerabilities with log4j 2.x. More specifically, logback does not 
> suffer from aforementioned said RCE vulnerability in any shape or form.
> 
> Unfortunately, the vulnerability exists under SLF4J API when log4j 2.x 
> is used as the back-end implementation. Given the severity of this 
> issue, we  encourage you to consider logback as the preferred back-end 
> for SLF4J API.
> 
> Also note that logback performs significantly better than log4 2.x.
> 
> Please see the benchmark results at:
> 
>   http://logback.qos.ch/performance.html <http://logback.qos.ch/performance.html>
> 
> Better yet, run the benchmark yourself.
> 
>    https://github.com/ceki/logback-perf <https://github.com/ceki/logback-perf>
> 
> In our opinion, logging libraries need to be reliable first and foremost 
> with new features added only with extreme care.
> 
> Best regards,
> 
> Further references to the RCE vulnerability:
> 
>    https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/ <https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/>
>    https://twitter.com/P0rZ9/status/1468949890571337731 <https://twitter.com/P0rZ9/status/1468949890571337731>
>    https://github.com/apache/logging-log4j2/pull/608 <https://github.com/apache/logging-log4j2/pull/608>
> 
> --
> Ceki Gülcü
> 
> Please contact sales at qos.ch <mailto:sales at qos.ch> for support related to SLF4J or logback 
> projects.
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